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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NORTH UNION CANAL COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Vs. 
DANIEL E. NEWELL and 
RUTH I. NEWELL, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 14238 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for an Order requiring Defendants 
to remove a fence erected along a right-of-way acquired by-
prescription by the Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Court, and the Court found 
Plaintiff's evidence insufficient to show that Plaintiff's ease-
ment has been interfered with by the Defendants. From a Judgment 
for the Defendants, Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment and Judgment 
requiring Defendants to remove the fence placed along Plaintiff's 
easement. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff has a prescrip-
tive easement to convey water through the canal which runs through 
Defendants1 property and acknowledge that Plaintiff has a right 
to maintain and operate said canal. Defendants acknowledge con-
struction of a fence adjoining the canal and two twelve-foot 
gates allowing access to the canal bank (TR page 11, lines 24-26, 
page 12, lines 10-12). Defendants acknowledge a conversation 
with Mr. Gillman regarding erection of the fence at a time when 
Defendants were in the process of completing the fence and gates 
in question. (TR page 12, line 3). 
The witnesses produced at the trial all testified that 
cleaning of the canal is performed by entering the canal through 
the utilization of ramps provided for said purpose and driving 
down the bottom of the canal with a truck and equipment and that 
the banlcs of said canal are not utilized. Mr. Newell (TR page 13, 
lines 27-30); Mr, Gillman (TR page 23, lines 6-8; page 23, lines 
11-20; page 24, lines 5-24); Mr. Swenson (TR page 45, lines 1-7; 
page 46, lines 27-30; page 47, lines 1-6; page 47, lines 25-30; 
page 48, lines 1-3); Mr McKellar (TR page 62, lines 24-30); 
Mr. Pratt (TR page 69, lines 21-25); also, Mr. Walker who had 
actual knowledge of the cementing of said canal testified that 
the cleaning was effectuated through the bottom of the canal 
itself $nd that the cement was poured by utilizing the canal it-
self (TR page 35, lines 22-24; page 37, lines 20-26; page 39, 
lines 20-30; page 40, lines 1-14). " 
From the testimony of Mr. Swenson, it appears that 
Plaintiff has avoided utilizing the Newell property consistently 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
because there are no head-gates in the area (TR page 45, lines 
22-26) and that Plaintiff had utilized the bank of the canal 
on Defendants' property for a limited number of times since 
1951. (TR page 53, lines 19-30). 
Plaintiff has never had unlimited ingress and egress 
in regard to Defendants' property because of boundry fences 
which go right to the very edge of Plaintiff's canal (TR page 
74, lines 22-24; page 78). 
Plaintiff's witnesses have testified that they would 
not be unduly burdened by opening the gates provided by the 
Defendants. (TR page 63, lines 26-30; page 64, lines 1-4; page 
70, lines 6-12) . 
Defendants, by erecting the fence and gates in quest-
ion, are attempting to utilize the property for a building lot 
(TR page 76, lines 7-20) and to abolish a safety hazard which 
has existed on Defendants' property. (TR page 73, lines 1-8). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S EASEMENT HAS BEEN, OR WILL BE 
IN THE FUTURE, INTERFERED WITH BY THE ERECTION 
OF A FENCE BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiff has not shown that the erection of a fence 
on the west bank of Plaintiff's right-of-way by the Defendants 
has interfered with the utilization of the right-of-way by the 
Plaintiff. It is not contended that Defendants have interfered 
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with the actual flow of water in the canal; rather, Plaintiff 
is alleging that it should be entitled to an additional unre-
stricted easement along the banks of said canal for the purpose 
of cleaning and maintenance. However, Plaintiff's witnesses "" 
have testified that the cement lining of the canal was original-
ly installed by trucks and equipment entering the canal by per-
manent ramps and by pouring the cement from the bottom of the 
canal. (TR page 35, lines 22-25; page 37, lines 20-25). All 
of the witnesses have testified that the canal is cleaned by 
equipment entering the canal through the utilization of ramps 
provided at strategic points and then proceeding through the 
bottom of the canal to effectuate the cleaning and maintenance 
of the same, as shown in Respondents' Statement of Facts and 
by Defendants1 exhibits, numbers 25, 29, 30 and 36. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Lund v. Phillips Petroleum 
Company, 10 U. 2d 276, 351 P,2d 952 (1960) at page 954 stated: 
To be sustainable in law the verdict need 
only fall within that orbit so that it can 
be said that there is substantial evidence 
from which reasonable minds could believe 
facts which will support it. 
A general proposition regarding the sufficiency and 
weight of evidence is stated at 30 Am Jur 2d Evidence, Sec. 1080, 
page 226-227: f 
On the other hand, evidence is sufficient 
" or satisfactory if it is such as to satisfy 
an unprejudiced mind of the truth. 
Testimony elecited on cross-examination must 
be given force and effect along with other 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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evidence, and the interest of the witness 
in the result of the trial, and his con-
sequent bias, are matters to be consider-
ed, particularly if the witness1 testimony 
is uncorroborated or is contradicted by 
other evidence. 
As shown, the bottom of the canal is utilized by the Plaintiff 
for cleaning and maintenance and not the banks. 
The Supreme Court should not overturn the Trial 
Court's Judgment unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the Judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Weggeland v. Ujifusa, 
14 U. 2d 364, 384 P.2d 590 (1963), at page 591 held: 
This being a case in equity, we sustain 
the findings and determination made below 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them; or the court has misapplied 
rules of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court confirmed this statement in 
In Re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 12 U. 2d 1, 
361 P.2d 407 (1961). There is clearly sufficient evidence for 
the Trial Court to find that Defendants have not interfered 
with Plaintiff's right-of-way. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO UTILIZE THEIR 
PROPERTY IN ANY REASONABLE MANNER WITHOUT THE 
APPELLANT'S CONSENT. 
Merely because of the fact Appellant's easement was 
established without a fence along the right-of-way does not 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mean that Respondents cannot utilize the servient estate. At 
28 CJS Easements Sec. 90, the general proposition of law in 
this regard is stated at page 770: 
Unless he expressly agrees to the contrary, 
the owner of the servient estate may use 
his property in any manner and for any pur-
pose consistent with the enjoyment of the 
easement, and the owner of the dominant 
estate cannot interfere with this use. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Stevens, et al. v. Bird-Jex 
Co., 81 U. 355, 18 P.2d 292, (1933), adopts this statement at 
page 295, Also, the Court in the Bird-Jex Case, Supra, at 
page 294 states: 
Ordinarily the grant of an easement over 
land does not prevent the owner of the fee 
from so using it as not to unreasonably 
interfere with the special use for which 
the easement was granted. 
A general proposition of law regarding the fencing of 
a right-of-way is set forth in 25 Am Jur 2d, Easements § Licenses 
Sec. 89, page 495-496: 
• • . ' " • • " - ' • • " ^ • ' . . * • • » 
The owner of premises which are subject to 
the easement of a way may or may not fence 
along the way, as his convenience may dictate, 
provided he does not obstruct the right of 
passage. 
The California Supreme Court in adopting this pro-
position of law, reserved every incident of ownership not in-
consistent with the easement to the fee holder and in Dolske 
v. Gornqey, 25 Cal.Rptr. 270, 375 P.2d 174 (1962), at page 178 
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stated: 
Furthermore, the owner of the servient 
estate may construct a fence long the 
easement right of way so long as the 
fence is not placed as to be inconsis-
tent with the rights of the dominant 
owner. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in Fortner et al. v. 
El Dorado Springs Resort Co., et al., 230 P. 386 (1924) has 
gone even further in stating that a gate may be erected over 
the actual right-of-way where there is a benefit to the fee 
holder and only a slight inconvenience to the dominant estate. 
In the above matter, gates have been erected to allow access, 
if necessary; (TR page 64, lines 1-4; page 12, lines 10-12r 
Defendants1 exhibits 27 and 28). In the present case, there 
has been no fencing of the actual easement, but merely the 
boundry of said easement, and it appears that there is an 
extremely limited use of the area complained of by the Plain-
tiff (TR page 53, lines 19-30). 
In the present case, there has been no obstruction 
of the canal, but merely a fencing along the right-of-way and 
an attempt to utilize the servient estate by the fee holder 
(TR page 73, lines 1-8). 
Appellant relies primarily on Holm v. Davis, et al., 
41 U. 200, 125 P.403, (1912) which can be distinguished from 
the present action. The Court, in the Holm's decision, held 
that the owners of the dominant estate can enter the servient 
estate to effectaute repairs and maintenance. As shown by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Statement o£ Facts, Respondents have never contested Appellant's 
right to enter the servient estate to effectuate repairs and 
maintenance, Nephi Irrigation Co, v. Bailey, et al., Ill U. 
402, 181 P.2d 215 (1947) at page 216, relied upon by the Appell-
ant, also holds that the dominant estate may enter upon the ser-
vient estate to make repairs and for maintenance and the Court 
holds that there should be "...no unnecessary injury to the 
servient estate.ff Valley Development Co. v. Weeks
 ? 364 P.2d 
730 (1961), relied upon by the Appellant is not applicable be-
cause Respondents are not attempting to destroy a vested ease-
ment, being the utilization of the canal in question, but Res-
pondents are only attempting to utilize the servient estate for 
its most practical purpose. (TR page 73, lines 1-8; page 76, 
lines 7-20). Also, the case of Robins v. Roberts, 80 U. 409 
15 P.2d 340, (1932) relied upon by Plaintiff stated at page 342: 
An easement acquired by prescription is 
always limited to the use made during the 
prescriptive period. 
Appellant has not shown the required use on the property in 
question. (TR page 53, lines 19-30; page 45, lines 24-26.) 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 73-1-15, 1953 as amended, and relied 
upon by Appellant is not applicable in this situation because 
there has been no "...obstruction, or change of the water flow 
by fence or otherwise..."/Respondents have merely erected a 
fence along the right-of-way. (TR page 11, lines 24-26). This 
also makes Appellant's illustration taken from 5 Reinstatement 
Property, Sec. 510 Illustration 3 at page 3106 inapplicable be-
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cause there is no interference with the prescriptive easement, 
merely a utilization of the servient estate by the fee owner. 
Utah, by court decision, has adopted the policy that 
the fee holder should be allowed to utilize the servient estate 
for any lawful purpose as long as he does not interfere with 
the actual easement. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Morris v. Blunt, et al. 
49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916) recognized that the dominant estate 
should interfere with the servient estate as little as possible 
and at page 1133 stated: 
In construing any grant of right of way the 
use, in character and extent, is limited to 
such as is reasonably necessary and conven-
ient to the dominant estate and as little 
burdensome to the servient estate as possible 
for the use contemplated. 
The Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in 
Wade et al. v. Dorius, 52 U. 310 173 P. 564 (1918)- The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Sandberg, 105 U. 93 141 P.2d 696, 
(1943) coped with the question as outlined on page 701: 
Can the water user who merely has an ease-
ment over land for conducting water through 
a ditch impose limitations upon the use which 
the land owner may make of his land? 
The Utah Supreme Court, after extensive review of 
other court decisions, stated at page 701: 
The servient estate can only be subjected 
to the easement to the extent to which the 
easement was acquired, and the easement 
owner cannot change this use so as to put 
any greater burden upon the servient estate. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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And as has been shown, the banks of Respondents1 property are 
not readily accessible because of boundry line fences. (TR 
page 74, lines 22-24), and have been used only occasionally 
by the Appellant. (TR page 45, lines 24-26; page 53, lines 
19-30). The Court also stated at page 701 and 702: 
fNeither can the ditch owner so use his ease-
ment as to materially interfere with the 
ordinary use of the land by the landowner.1 
Kinney, Vol. II, Sec. 992. fAnd in this 
connection it may be stated that as a 
general proposition, every man has a right 
to the ordinary and natural use and enjoy-
ment of his own property, and if while law-
fully in such use and enjoyment, without 
negligence or malice, a loss occurs to 
his neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria, 
for the rightful use of ones own land may 
cause damage to the other without legal 
wrong.f 
The owner must likewise so use his ease-
ment as not to materially interfere with 
the ordinary use of his land by the owner 
of the servient estate. *** And, in the 
absence of limitations imposed by contract, 
or otherwise, the owner of the servient 
estate has the undoubted right to use his 
land according to the ordinary course of 
husbandry, including the right to graze 
his livestock thereon. He may without 
negligence use it as 'similar land in the 
vicinity is ordinarily used and for which 
it is naturally fitted,f and repairs to 
the ditch made necessary by such ordinary 
use must be made by the ditch owner. 
The following cases from other jurisdictions support 
the idea upheld by the Utah Supreme Court that the fee owner can 
utilize the servient estate for its usual or customary purpose 
as long as the easement is not interfered with. Dyer et al. v. 
Compere, 41 N.M. 716 73 P.2d 1356 (1937); Hotchkiss v. Young, 
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71 P. 324 Supreme Court of Oregon, (1903); and Pioneer Irr. 
Dist. v, Smith, 48 Idaho 734,285 P. 474 (1930). 
The Utah Supreme Court,in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Co. v. Moyle, 109 U. 197, 174 P. 2d 148 (1946), recognized the 
servient owner as owner of the fee and his rights subject only 
to the reasonable use of the easement by the dominant estate. 
The Court stated at page 157 and 158: 
In the case at bar the purpose of the use 
during the prescriptive period was to convey 
water for irrigation across the defendants1 
land. 
Though the right to improve the ditches in 
the interests of water conservation is within 
the easement the irrigation company has across 
defendants1 land it does not follow the com-
pany can exercise that right in any manner 
it sees fit. 
The rights of the dominant owner are limited 
by the rights of the servient owner... Each 
owner must exercise his rights so as not to 
unreasonably interfere with the other... 
The owners must have due regard for each 
other and should exercise that degree of 
care and use which a just consideration for 
the rights of the other demands.*** 
It is elementary that the use of an ease-
ment must be as reasonable and as little 
burdensome to the servient estate as the 
nature of the easement and its purpose 
will permit. 
The servient owner is the owner of the fee and 
as such has all the rights of the owner of 
the fee subject only to the reasonable use 
of the easement. 
In the present matter, Respondents have attempted to 
obtain a balance of use by installing two twelve-foot gates (TR 
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page 12 lines 1-12) allowing access by the Appellant, if neces-
sary. 
The Court more recently in Weggeland v. Unifusa, 
14 U 2d. 364, 384 P. 2d 590, reaffirmed that an easement should 
burden the servient estate only to the degree necessary to 
satisfy the purposes of said easement. The purpose of Appell-
ant's easement is to convey water across Respondents' property, 
and there has been no showing that Respondents have interfered 
with this use. 
The Appellant, by attempting to have the fence border-
ing the canal removed because of a possible use for such area 
in the future (TR page 46), is attempting to unreasonably inter-
fere with the fee owner's utilization of the servient estate, 
contrary to the law which has been established in Utah. 
I CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court was correct in finding that Respon-
dents ' fence did not interfere with the prescriptive easement 
belonging to the Appellant for the conveyance of water across 
Respondents' property. Respondents, in this instance, are 
merely attempting to utilize the servient estate for its 
natural purpose, being that of a building lot, and an attempt to 
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eradicate a safety hazard to the neighborhood, which is allowed 
under the law as established in Utah. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
GERALD M. CONDER 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
1305 J.C. Penney Building 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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